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Abstract
The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), together with a large and growing literature of
ancillary results, suggests two conclusions. First, large committees outperform small
committees, other things equal. Second, heterogeneous committees can, under the
right circumstances, outperform homogeneous ones, again other things equal. But this
literature has done little to bring these two conclusions together. This paper employs
simulations to compare the respective contributions of size and dierence to optimal
committee performance. It demonstrates that the contributions depend dramatically
upon bias. In the presence of low bias, committee composition matters little. In the
presence of high bias, it can matter a great deal; optimal committee performance,
however, does not vary dramatically between low- and high-bias committees.
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1 Introduction
The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) established in the late eighteenth century that when it
comes to decision-making, size matters. Other things equal, a large committee will outper-
form a small one. But a growing literature suggests that dierence matters as well as size.
Other things equal, a heterogeneous committee, with people representing dierent back-
grounds and perspectives, will outperform a committee of clones. This heterogeneity may
reect dierences in race, gender, socioeconomic class, or a variety of other factors. Recent
generalizations of the CJT model demonstrate the truth of this claim, although they also
note that heterogeneity only produces benecial eects under moderately restrictive circum-
stances. This paper uses these generalizations to compare the respective merits of size and
dierence. It then makes policy recommendations based upon this comparison.
Section 2 reviews existing results on the contributions size and diversity make to decision-
making. These results rely upon a generalized form of the CJT model. Section 3 derives
expressions for measuring committee success in a collective decision-making environment
characterized by diversity. Section 4 employs simulations to generate comparative statics for
the respective contributions of size and diversity within this model. This enables comparisons
of these contributions under a variety of assumptions. Section 5 concludes by exploring the
policy implications of the results.
2 Size and Diversity
In his classic work Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues
a la Pluralite des Voix (1785), Condorcet imagined a committee charged with making some
decision using simple majority rule. The decision is dichotomous, with the committee facing a
choice between options a and b. One option is unambiguously better than the other, although
the identity of the better option is obviously not known in advance. All committee members
share a common utility function which is maximized if the correct option is chosen. The
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committee is comprised of n = 2k+1 members (i.e., n is odd), each of whom decides correctly
with xed common probability p, with 1
2
< p < 1. The probability that one committee
member votes correctly is independent of the probability that any other committee member
votes correctly. Under these conditions, Condorcet demonstrated that the following two
results hold: 1) the probability that the committee majority will decide correctly is higher
than p; and 2) the probability that the committee majority will decide correctly approaches
1 as the size of the committee increases (Baker 1976). Committee size matters, other things
equal. Indeed, for a xed value of p, a larger committee will always outperform a smaller
one (Berend and Sapir 2005).
Relaxing the (admittedly rigid) assumptions underlying the CJT can be accomplished
without undermining the central results, so long as it is done with caution. Grofman, Owen
and Feld (1983), for example, showed that majorities still outperform the average individual
in a group even if p varies by individual, so long as the distribution of values of p is sym-
metric. Boland (1989) demonstrated that the distribution of values of p does not matter,
so long as the average value of p is suciently high. Paroush (1997) has demonstrated the
importance of Boland's result, by showing that having the average value of p exceed 1
2
is not
a sucient condition for the CJT's result under certain distributions of voter competence.
Owen, Grofman and L. Feld (1989), however, demonstrated that an average value of p ex-
ceeding 1
2
is sucient for the asymptotic result (i.e., for the probability of majority success
to approach 1 as committee size increases).
Other factors inuence, not the results regarding committee performance, but their ap-
plication. The committee may, for example, know in advance that one option is ex ante more
likely than the other to be correct. Assume, without loss of generality, that option a is cor-
rect with probability   1
2
. Then the option that is maximally likely to be correct when all
information is taken into account may not be the same as the option that is maximally likely
to be correct when only the individual judgments are considered. In particular, the optimal
voting rule will have a presumption in favor of a, with b winning only if a suciently large
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supermajority favors it. Alternatively, the committee's utility function could treat dier-
ently a wrongful rejection of a and wrongful rejection of b. A jury might be more concerned
about convicting the innocent than acquitting the guilty. Suppose the group loses utility
ea by wrongfully rejecting a and eb by wrongfully rejecting b. (The group receives utility 0
if it chooses correctly.) Then the rule that maximizes the probability of successful choice,
in terms of committee member judgments, may not be the rule that maximizes expected
utility. The committee might prefer to sacrice some probability of correctly choosing b in
exchange for a smaller increase in the probability of correctly choosing a, because the cost
of failing to choose a correctly is suciently high. Once again, this translates into a voting
rule with a presumption in favor of a.
In practice, then, there is a close link between the ex ante probability that each option
is correct and the costs associate with each type of mistake. A committee with   1
2
and
ea = eb will maximize expected utility with a certain supermajority voting rule that favors
a. For every such value of , there exists a committee with unequal values of ea and eb and
 = 1
2
that optimizes performance using the same voting rule. As a result, the literature has
tended to treat these two cases together (e.g. Nitzan and Paroush 1984, 1994; Ben-Yashar,
Koh and Nitzan 2009).1
Much less has been said regarding what (if any) contribution dierence makes in the CJT
environment.2 One possible way of capturing this contribution is to assume that homogeneity
leads to violations of the independence assumption. Given this assumption, heterogeneity
improves decision-making by decreasing the average correlation level between individual
judgments. This in turn results in better committee decision-making (Ladha 1992). Another
approach is to compare homogeneous and heterogeneous committees for a xed average
value of p. This is the approach taken by Kanazawa (1998) and Fey (2003). But this
1See also Chwe (1999), which demonstrated that a committee whose members have dierent prior beliefs
regarding the correct option is equivalent to a committee whose members have the same prior beliefs but
dierent attitudes towards risk.
2Surowiecki (2005) explores the contribution of dierence in non-voting environments. Page (2008) deals
with dierence in voting systems, but without reference to the CJT.
3
approach leaves no room for the marginal contribution of diversity. Other things equal, if a
committee adds one more member, it should add one with the highest possible competence
level. There is thus no positive advantage to including people of dierent backgrounds on
the Kanazawa/Fey approach, assuming independence is assured.
A third approach is to model the dierential contributions made by dierent groups
explicitly. This can be accomplished by introducing the idea of bias into the decision.
Assume again that option a is correct ex ante with probability . Assume further that the
committee can be composed of members from two dierent groups, X and Y. Members of
X select a when a is correct with probability q, and b when b is correct with probability
p, with q > p > 1
2
. Members of Y select a when a is correct with probability p, and b
when b is correct with probability q. Thus, X-members are biased in favor of a, whereas
Y-members have an equal and opposite bias in favor of b. The term \bias" is not ideal. It has
connotations of irrationality that we do not intend. We have considered using other terms
for this variation in competence levels with the state of the world. This variation is easily
confused with variation in competence levels between individuals. We believe that \bias" is
the best term available for avoiding this confusion. Finally, allow the error costs ea and eb
to vary. All committee members, regardless of group, receive utility 0 for a correct choice,
pay cost ea if a is wrongfully rejected, and pay cost eb if b is wrongfully rejected.
Stone (2012) demonstrates that given these assumptions (and assuming the committee
votes via majority rule) the optimal committee composition will be a function of p, q, ,
ea, and eb. The expected utility-maximizing committee will have k + s
 X-members and
k s+1 Y-members on it, where s is the smallest integral value of s between  k and k for
which the inequality ea
eb

1  >
h
p(1 p)
q(1 q)
is
fails to hold. (There may be no such value, in which
case an all-X member committee will be optimal.) Should the inequality hold for s = k,
then an all X-member committee would be optimal. And should it fail to hold for s =  k,
then an all Y-member committee would maximize expected utility. Moreover, this condition
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requires that q > 1 p, a condition ensured whenever p > 1
2
.3 If q  1 p, then heterogeneity
never increases, and sometimes decreases, expected committee utility. Heterogeneity thus
may, but not necessarily will, make a dierence for the better. In the simplest case, where
 = 1
2
and ea = eb, the optimal committee will be maximally heterogeneous, with a bare
majority of X-members on it. (A bare majority of Y-members will perform equally well.)
Stone's model suggests that committee decision-making can be improved either by taking
steps to ensure optimal committee composition or by increasing committee size. Stone's
original result, however, does not consider the respective magnitudes of these two approaches.
When does size matter a lot, and when does dierence matter a lot? Under what conditions
will taking steps to ensure diversity prove more cost-eective than simply involving more
people? These are the questions explored in this paper.
3 Comparing Size and Diversity
Committee performance can be assessed either in terms of the probability that the committee
decides correctly via majority rule, or in terms of the expected utility of committee decision-
making. (The one is equal to the other whenever the costs associated with the two types
of error are the same.) We will begin, therefore, by deriving expressions for both of these
measures.
Assume a committee with k+ s X-members and k  s+1 Y-members. Then conditional
upon the state of the world (say, a), committee decision making functions as a pair of sets of
Bernoulli trials. We assume throughout that committee members vote sincerely. This is not
an innocuous assumption, even under the assumption (standard in the CJT literature) of a
common utility function (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996). Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007),
however, demonstrate that sincere voting will always be rational in the CJT environment
whenever the optimal voting rule is used. This is easy to nd in many cases|as noted
3This condition is minimal but not negligible. If it were not satised, then an X-member would be more
likely to select a when b is correct than when a is correct!
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before, simple majority rule will be optimal whenever  = 1
2
and ea = eb|but more dicult
to identify at other times. It is equivalent to making multiple tosses of two coins, one of
which has a dierent bias towards heads than the other. Coin 1 gets tossed k+ s times, and
lands heads up with probability q, while coin 2 gets tossed k   s + 1 times, and comes up
heads with probability p. Let x be the number of correct votes by the X-members, y be the
number of correct votes by the Y-members, and z = x+y be the total number of correct votes
in a committee. Then the expected counts of correct votes by dierent types of members are
calculated given the state of the world: E(x j a) = (k + s)q, E(x j b) = (k + s)p, E(y j a) =
(k+s 1)p, and so forth. One can use these to calculate the (unconditional) expected counts
of correct votes in the committee: E(z) = (k+ s)[q+(1  )p] + (k+ s+1)[p+(1  )q].
One can use this measure as a building block in order to calculate Ca (or Cb), the
probability that the committee decides correctly via majority rule, conditional on a (or b)
being correct. Then one can also calculate C, the unconditional probability of a correct
committee vote:
C =Ca + (1  )Cb
=ki=0
 
k+s
s+i

(1  q)s+iqk i ij=0   k s+1j  (1  p)k s+1 jpj
+ (1  )ki=0
 
k+s
s+i

(p)s+i(1  p)k i ij=0   k s+1j  (q)k s+1 j(1  q)j :
(1)
Finally, let u be the utility derived from a committee vote. This vote will yield utility 0
with probability Ca + (1   )Cb; utility ea with probability (1   Ca), and utility eb with
probability (1  )(1  Cb). The expected utility E(u) of a committee vote is thus:
ea(1  Ca) + eb(1  )(1  Cb): (2)
With these preliminaries out of the way, it becomes possible to compare the respective
contributions of size and diversity both to C and to E(u). As mentioned before, whenever
ea = eb the expected utility of the committee is maximized if and only if the probability
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of correct committee choice is maximized.4 For this reason, it makes sense to focus upon
investigating this special case.
As discussed in the previous section, the heterogeneous committee achieves the highest
probability of a correct committee vote under certain conditions (Stone 2012). This implies
that as the parameter s increases beyond a certain point, the probability of a correct com-
mittee vote decreases. However, the probability of a correct committee decision-making C
is determined by the multiple parameters n, p, q, s and , with the eect of each parameter
being a function of other four. Even though we can explore the sign of the impact ana-
lytically, it is very dicult to examine the relative impact of the committee diversity, bias,
and size on its performance. If we can repeat the committee's decision-making a certain
number of times (for example, 10,000 times), we can calculate the probability of the correct
committee vote given a set of the parameters, which is close to the objective probability of
correct collective choice. Hence, we use the Monte Carlo simulation approach to explore the
relationship between the relative impact of each parameter and the optimal committee.
4 Monte Carlo Simulation
Our simulation procedures are as follows. First, the state of the world 2 fa; bg is drawn
from the bernoulli distribution with Pr(a) = . Second, the count of correct votes in the
committee is generated as the sum of a pair of binomial distributions B(X; q) + B(Y; p) if
the state of the world a is chosen, and B(X; p) + B(Y; q) otherwise. Third, if the majority
of the committee (k+1 members) vote correctly, this is called committee success. Fifth, we
iterate this procedures 10,000 times for a given set of parameters n, p, q, s, and , and then
calculate the ratio of committee success, which is called here the probability of committee
success. As a further simplifying assumption, we begin with  = 1
2
and relax it later. We
address the three theoretical issues below.
4If ea = eb, then E(u) = ea[(1   Ca) + (1   )(1   Cb)] = ea[1   C]. Because ea < 0, this means that
we can nd a maximum of E(u) by maximizing C.
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1. Homogeneity versus heterogeneity. If   1
2
, then the optimal commit-
tee will always have an X-member majority. Without loss of generality, then,
we will assume the committee will have such a majority. We will then com-
pare the maximally homogeneous committee (i.e., 100% X-member) with
the maximally heterogeneous committee (i.e., a bare X-member majority).
We will also consider all committee compositions within this range. When
 = 1
2
and ea = eb, the optimal committee will be maximally heterogeneous.
This may not be the case, however, if either condition fails to hold.
2. Bias (the relative sizes of q and p). Committee composition could
potentially matter much more when the biases of committee members are
large than when they are small. The size of a bias is larger the greater
the distance between q and p. We shall consider a high-bias and a low-bias
committee.
3. Committee size. Obviously, the higher the value of n, the better the
committee will perform. We will take this into account by comparing several
values of n. Specically, we will consider n = 11, 21, 51, 101, 201 and
401. All of these are realistic committee sizes for at least certain classes of
decisions.
Figure 1 shows the simulation results for the low-bias committee (p = 0:51 and q = 0:55)
and the high-bias committee (p = 0:51 and q = 0:85). The committee performance is mea-
sured by the probability of correct committee vote. To provide the intuitive understanding
of the patterns, we use the degree of homogeneity k+s
n
 100 to examine the committee
composition. When we increase s from 1 to k + 1, the committee becomes progressively
more homogeneous. It changes from approximately 50 percent X-members to 100 percent
X-members. The parameter  = 0:5 means that two states of the world a and b are equally
8
likely to occur.
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Figure 1: the High-Bias Committee and the Low-Bias Committee
We observe two results. First, more homogeneity worsens high-bias committee perfor-
mance, which is consistent with the theoretical arguments by Stone (2012). The dierence
is particularly striking for high values of n. For these values, heterogeneous high-bias com-
mittees perform nearly perfectly, while homogeneous high-bias committees still have a long
way to go before C approaches 1. In contrast, heterogeneity matters little for the perfor-
mance of the low-bias committee of relatively small size (n  101) because the probability of
committee success remain the same over dierent values of the parameters. For the low bias
committee of relatively large size (n > 101), more homogeneity does somewhat constrain the
committee performance.
Second, increasing committee size enhances performance regardless of homogeneity level.
With  = 0:5, the maximally heterogenous committee clearly performs the best in all cases
except for low-bias commitees with small numbers of members. In these cases, heterogeneity
makes a negligible dierence.
It is not too surprising that the high-bias committees routinely outperform the low-bias
committees here, for all values of n. Ex ante (i.e., before state of the world is selected),
9
both X-members and Y-members have an expected competence level of 0:68 in the high-bias
model, but only 0:53 in the low-bias model. It is therefore dicult to distinguish the eects
generated by having a more-or-less competent committee from the eects generated by bias
size. To address this problem, we ran simulations for two further models (Figure 2). In
both of these models, X- and Y-members have the same ex ante competence level, equal
to 0:625. In the modied high-bias model, q = 0:74 and p = 0:51, while in the modied
low-bias model, q = 0:65 and p = 0:6.
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Figure 2: the High-Bias Committee and the Low-Bias Committee
The results generated here are similar but not identical. First, once again the heteroge-
neous committee is clearly best in the presence of high bias while committee composition
hardly matters for the low-bias committee. Second, when the ex ante probability of success
is the same for both committees, with the heterogeneous composition, the probability of
success in the low-bias committee is almost the same as that in the high-bias committee. In
contrast to the previous results, as the committee composition becomes homogeneous, the
low-bias committee clearly begins to outperform the high-bias committee. Third, increasing
committee size once again increases the probability of committee success. In the high-bias
committee, increasing the size raises the probability of committee success and reduces the
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relative eect of homogeneity. The heterogeneous committee success rate rapidly approaches
1, and so its comparative advantage lessens as the homogeneous committee gets large as well.
(It has nowhere to go.) On the other hand, the size of the committee matters for the rel-
atively small committee because the probability of committee success is almost one for the
committee with more than 100 members.
Next we relax our assumption regarding the states of the world and assume  = 0:75,
so that state of the world a is signicantly more likely to occur than state of the world b
(Figure 3). We employ the same values of p and q as in the rst set of simulations and
consider the results. First, both the high-bias and the low-bias committees demonstrate
interesting results regarding the composition of the committee. The high-bias committee
with more than 50 members generates results similar to those previously seen. That is, the
best committee is the most heterogeneous and more homogeneity dampens the committee
performance. Things are somewhat dierent for the high-bias committees with 11 and 21
members. The reason for this is that when  = 0:75, s = 2. The optimal committee will
thus have 3 more X-members than Y-Members on it. This makes a signicant dierence for
small high-bias committees. The optimal 11- and 21-member committees will have 7 and 12
X-members, respectively; put another way, the percentage of these committees comprised
of X-members will be 63% and 57%. Maximal heterogeneity is thus no longer optimal
heterogeneity, even though homogeneity still does worse.
A similar, but much stronger, result obtains for the low-bias committee. For this case,
s = 114. This means that, for every low-bias committee of less than maximal size, the
optimal composition will involve no Y-members at all. Even for the 401-member committee,
the optimal committee will have a 314-87 majority in favor of X-members. It will be 78% X-
member. The simulation results clearly reect this, as the homogeneous low-bias committee
outperforms any heterogeneous one (albeit marginally), except when n = 401. These results
are caused by the assumption on the states of the world  = 0:75. Since state of the world
a is more likely to occur, the committee can improve its performance by including more
11
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Figure 3: the High-Bias Committee and the Low-Bias Committee
X-members who are more likely to detect states of world a.
As in the rst set of simulations, however, it is dicult to distinguish the eect of the
bias size from the eect of the overall competence level. For this reason, we ran one nal
pair of simulations with  = 0:75 but with the same competence levels as in the second set of
simulations (Figure 4). Once again, optimal committee composition will not be maximally
heterogeneous. For the high-bias committee, s = 4, and for the low-bias committee, s = 21.
This means that, even for the high-bias committee, the optimal committee will consist almost
entirely of X-members for low values of n. And the optimal low-bias committee will have no
Y-members at all until n = 51.
Otherwise, the results are essentially the same as in the second set of simulations. For
high values of n, the optimal committee performs extremely well for both high- and low-bias
committees. Indeed, when n is at least 101, optimal committee performance is near-perfect.
But the dierence between committee with the best composition and the committee with the
worst composition is far more pronounced in the presence of high bias than in the presence of
low bias. With low bias, composition makes a relatively small contribution to performance.
But with high bias, even a 401-member homogeneous committee will have a signicnt chance
12
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Figure 4: the High-Bias Committee and the Low-Bias Committee
of failure, while a 401-member heterogeneous committee will almost never fail.
5 Conclusion
The simulation results impart several important lessons regarding committee performance
in the presence of bias. Most importantly, heterogeneity is more likely to make a dierence,
for better or for worse, the committee members have high bias. By \high bias," we mean
a large dierence between the values of p and q. In the presence of high bias, committee
composition will matter much more. The optimal committee will signicantly outperform
committees with less-than-optimal composition. This will be true regardless of the value
of s. If the optimal committee is homogeneous, then a homogeneous high-bias committee
will signicantly outperform a heterogeneous one. If the optimal committee is heterogeneous,
then the opposite will occur. This dierence will tend to shrink as n gets large for one obvious
reason. As n gets large, the optimal committee will decide correctly with a probability near
one. And so for large values of n, the dierence between the best committee's performance
(which hovers near 1) and that of the worst will of necessity grow smaller. Note, however,
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that even for the largest high-bias committees, poor committee composition will signicantly
worsen committee performance. A 401-member high-bias committee that is composed well
will perform with near-perfection, but a 401-member high-bias committee that is composed
poorly will lag signicantly behind.
All of this suggests that, if a policy maker has control over the values of p and q, she
should prefer, other things equal, for the values to be close together rather than further
apart. The precise manner in which this works remains a subject for further study. Such
study could reveal, for example, how much the dierence between p and q matters relative
to the absolute sizes of the two variables. The present simulation results suggest that both
factors will considerably inuence committee success.
Normally, however, policy makers have no control over the existing biases within the
population. All they control is 1) how many people from that population get selected and
2) which people they select. (Policy makers could, of course, try to nd people with low
levels of bias, an intuitively obvious idea that our study supports.) If the policy maker
has no control over p and q, then the relative attention she gives to committee size versus
committee composition should vary according to the size of the bias. In the presence of high
bias, committee composition matters a great deal. In the presence of low bias, however,
committee composition matters little, and the only way to improve committee performance
signicantly is to increase n. Given that selection criteria can prove costly, especially if
employed on a large scale, this conclusion could matter signicantly in policymaking contexts.
Policy makers facing decisions in which the population is strongly divided may wish to select
smaller committee within which diversity of opinion is ensured. With low bias, policy makers
may wish to forego consideration of diversity and simply assemble a large committee.
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